Bastiat's
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by Dan Sullivan
Bastiat did acknowledge that land is not property in the sense
that labor products are property. Yet in his debates with people
he viewed as socialists, he seems to have lost this recognition
and to have overstated his case against them, making the same
mistake that many neolibertarians make today - that of ignoring
the impact of land titles and other privileges on the economic
dynamics of a community.
Failure to appreciate the economic Law
of Rent, or to recognize that interferences with the
natural laws of distribution spawn interferences with
production, leads one to conclusions that seem to make perfect
sense, but which don't reconcile with reality. An example of
this is in Bastiat's essay, "What
is
Seen and Not Seen," often referred to as "The
Broken-Window Fallacy."
Bastiat offers an example of a typical French citizen "James
Goodfellow" (the literal English translation of "Jacques
Bonhomme," a symbolic French name similar to "John Bull" in
England or "Joe Sixpack" in the United States), who is furious
that his window has been broken by his son. Onlookers say, "It's
an ill wind that blows nobody some good. Such accidents keep
industry going. Everybody has to make a living. What would
become of the glaziers if no one ever broke a window?"
Bastiat then argues that work does not enrich the people unless
it is productive work, that breaking a window provides
employment for the window glazier, but that, if not for the
expense of the window, Goodfellow would have spent the same
money elsewhere and thereby employed someone else. Bastiat
argues further that breaking and fixing a window fails to
increase wealth, and therefore fails to enrich people in the
aggregate. After all, the window that exists after the repair is
no greater than the window that existed before the window had
been broken. Breaking a window and then fixing it represents
nothing more than wasted effort, a statement that is obviously
true.
However, Bastiat goes on to say that this example "is exactly
the same as that which, unfortunately, underlies most of our
economic institutions." [emphasis added] Bastiat assumes that he
sees what other economists fail to see, and does not entertain
the possibility that they see something he
fails to see - namely that his example is not so exactly
similar after all.
His explicit targets are a protectionist newspaper, and a
government official who, according to Bastiat, "has calculated
with such precision what industry would gain from the burning of
Paris, because of the houses that would have to be rebuilt."
Although protectionism is problematic for other reasons,
Bastiat's analysis is none the less flawed.
As Bastiat extrapolates to criticize his adversaries, he
presumes that "Jacques Bonhomme," is representative of all
taxpayers - that they are all typical people who will spend
their money on other labor products if that money is not taken
in needless taxes or spent on needlessly broken windows.
Yet we see cities (including Paris) becoming prosperous after
being looted, sacked and burned in wars, and, most tellingly,
cities becoming prosperous after wars their countries had lost
and wars of dubious outcomes, with or without the interjection
of "foreign aid." (There is reason to believe that they recover
more quickly without
aid, but that is a matter for another article.) Avoiding the
complexities of war economics, we can also see that San
Francisco was much more prosperous five
years
after the great earthquake of 1906 than one year before
it, and that Chicago was similarly much more prosperous for
decades after the Great Chicago Fire than before the fire. So
was Johnstown, Pennsylvania more prosperous within a few years
after the great flood and other cities more prosperous shortly
after major calamities. Thus, what is "obviously true" in theory
does not fit the evidence.
How can these examples be reconciled with the broken-window
fallacy? After all, aren't earthquakes, fires, floods and wars
essentially window-breaking on a grand scale? Let us look at the
broken-window fallacy again, in the context of privileges
playing out on the Law of Rent. If we assume that the broken
window had been owned by a person who lived from earnings and
spent those earnings on labor products, as Bastiat has implied,
the gain to one worker, the glazier, would be completely offset
by the loss from another. The relationship between the return to
land and the return to labor is not affected in a significant
way, except that effort is expended non-productively.
Bastiat summarizes his position as follows: "Now, if James
Goodfellow is part of society, we must conclude that society,
considering its labors and its enjoyments, has lost the value of
the broken window. "
But what if it is a large landlord's window? Are we to presume
that landlords and tenants are part of a single, classless
society? That there is not a society of rent takers with one
community of interests and a society of rent payers with other
interests?
Let us suppose a town with a few landlords and many tenants.
(There might also be any number of owner-occupants, but that is
irrelevant to the illustration I am making.) These few landlords
collect rent from the tenants, and the tenants can only get that
money back by providing service. That is, they must either serve
the landlords or serve others who serve the landlords. If the
landlords are only desirous of so much service, using the rest
of their revenues to buy up more land, the reduction in the
supply of money circulating among the landless allows only so
many working people to be employed, the rest facing idleness and
eviction. While some work is meaningless and non-productive,
such as breaking a window in order to repair it, so is idleness
non-productive. The difference is that the non-productive work
of repairing a landlord's window can stave off eviction.
Meanwhile, as the landlords apply their rent revenues (beyond
what they reserve to spend on service), to bidding against one
another for land, land prices rise, land ownership becomes more
concentrated and, in all likelihood, rents will increase.
However, even if rents do not increase, concentrating land
ownership means that rent revenues will be shared among fewer
landlords, and fewer services will be subsequently demanded by
the landlords.
But were someone to go around breaking the windows of landlords,
there would be a greater demand, not only for glaziers, but for
policemen, until that person was caught. None of that demand is
productive, in Bastiat's sense of the word, but it affects the
ratio between the demand for labor and its supply. That
increased demand drives up wages so people can not only pay
their rent more easily, but can more easily purchase goods and
services from one another. After all, it is not merely the
glaziers and the policemen who are enriched by payments from the
landlord, those whom policeman and the glazier patronize, and
the people those people patronize, etc. Money circulates among
laborers, enabling all of them to profit from serving one
another until the landlord takes that money back out of
circulation.
Thus we see that, even in terms of price inflation, rents fell
and wages climbed tremendously after the San Francisco
Earthquake and the Chicago Fire. There was not only full
employment, but very gainful employment as laborers no longer
had to bid one another down to find work.
Even the Black Death led to more prosperous tenants, as it
reduced the number of peasants competing for land and thereby
reduced rents and raised wages in relation to prices:
The landlord's discomfort ultimately benefited the peasantry. Lower prices for foodstuffs and greater purchasing power from the last quarter of the fourteenth century onward, progressive disintegration of demesnes, and waning customary land tenure enabled the enterprising, ambitious peasant to lease or purchase property and become a substantial landed proprietor. The average size of the peasant holding grew in the late Middle Ages. Due to the peasant's generally improved standard of living, the century and a half following the magna pestilencia has been labeled a "golden age" in which the most successful peasant became a "yeoman" or "kulak" within the village community. Freed from labor service, holding a fixed copyhold lease, and enjoying greater disposable income, the peasant exploited his land exclusively for his personal benefit and often pursued leisure and some of the finer things in life. Consumption of meat by England's humbler social strata rose substantially after the Black Death, a shift in consumer tastes that reduced demand for grain and helped make viable the shift toward pastoralism in the countryside. Late medieval sumptuary legislation, intended to keep the humble from dressing above his station and retain the distinction between low— and highborn, attests both to the peasant's greater income and the desire of the elite to limit disorienting social change (Dyer, 1989; Gottfried, 1983; Hunt and Murray, 1999 ).
Now, I am not advocating window-breaking any more than I am
advocating earthquakes, fires, floods or Black Death. What I am
saying is that one cannot make assumptions about the
distribution of wealth being some kind of natural phenomenon
where land is monopolized. Monopoly interferes with the natural
distribution of wealth, and the laws of production are
subordinate to the laws of distribution.
That is, people produce in order to either consume or acquire
privileges. When some use privilege to pile up more and more
obligations than they care to consume, others are thereby
shackled by a lack of opportunity to produce and are left unable
to afford consuming much at all. This in turn stifles
production. Failure to take this into consideration leads to
conclusions that sound right but don't correlate to the
evidence.
Yes, breaking a window to repair it is needless waste, but so is
barring unemployed people from access to land and natural
resources on which and with which they might produce useful
things.
This is not a phenomenon that applies only to landlords and
tenants, either. It similarly impacts debtors when lenders keep
accumulating money to lend, or when owners of licensed
monopolies (railroads, public utility companies, etc.) keep
accumulating more monopolies from the proceeds of overcharging
the people. All of these privileges invite accumulation of
unused purchasing power in the hands of privilege, and thereby
reduce the purchasing power of those who actually produce
wealth.
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